In the summer of 2010, at the height of operations in Afghanistan, President Obama invited General Stanley McChrystsal, the four-star general and commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan into the Oval office and relieved him of duty. The General had recently given an interview to the Rolling Stones magazine, criticizing the Obama administration.
Obama recounts the episode in his memoir, A Promised Land: (the 2nd paragraph requires more attention)
“Over the course of twenty-four hours, I decided that this was different. As every military commander liked to remind me, America’s armed forces depended entirely on rigid discipline, clear codes of conduct, unit cohesion and strict chains of command. Because the stakes were always higher. Because any failure to act as part of a team, any individual mistakes, didn’t just result in embarrassment or lost profits. People could die. Any corporal or captain who publicly disparaged a bunch of superior officers in such vivid terms would pay a grave price. I saw no way to apply a different set of rules to a four-star general, no matter how gifted, courageous, or decorated he was. That need for accountability and discipline extended to matters of civilian control over the military — a point I’d emphasized at the Oval Office with [Robert] Gates and [Michael] Mullen, apparently to insufficient effect.”
I actually admired McChrystal’s rebel spirit, his apparent disdain for pretense and authority that, in his view, hadn’t been earned. It no doubt had made him a better leader and accounted for the fierce loyalty he elicited from the troops under his command. But in that Rolling Stone article, I’d heard in him and his aides the same air of impunity that seemed to have taken hold among some of the military’s top ranks during the Bush years: a sense that once the war began, those who fought it shouldn’t be questioned, that politicians should just give them what they ask for and get out of the way. It was a seductive view, especially coming from a man of McChrystal’s caliber. It also threatened to erode a bedrock principle of our representative democracy, and I was determined to put an end to it.”
At around 636 AD, Khalid ibn al-Walid (RA), the most revered military strategist and supreme commander of the Muslim armies in Syria at the time, was summarily dismissed by the then Caliph, Umer ibn Khattab (RA). A top military strategist, Khalid had never lost a battle. Considered an undisputed authority on battle tactics, Khalid used his resources to pull down the mighty Roman and Persian armies one after the other (in most of his encounters, the enemy had a 2:1 advantage in terms of sheer numbers). Note that both the empires had more than a 2000-year combined reign in their respective regions. Decorated with the title of Sayf Allah (Sword of Allah) by the Prophet (pbuh) himself, Umer (RA) went ahead with the dismissal order, with Khalid (RA) complying without a fuss.
Of the 75-year history of Pakistan since independence, 32 years have been under direct military rule, with the rest still having a strong flavor in the governing crucible. With almost a 50% split between civilian and military rule duration, we have never been able to have a persistent approach to develop ourselves. I am even tempted to say that I would have rather have a permanent military rule – for the sake of continuity – but then after looking at the list of more than a 100 countries with similar setups in the last 200 years or so, the picture cannot be clearer.
A quick browse of the list: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and 32 more in Africa. Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, and 19 others in South America. Cambodia, Iraq, Pakistan, and 21 more is Asia. Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, and 19 more in Europe. All of these countries have long suffered the effects of a military rule. Anyone from these making a shift towards a purely civilian system has seen tangible and lasting benefits coming their way.
Military training is devised around tactics and strategy, geared towards offensive and defensive battle plans. It is aimed towards achieving a status of preparedness and readiness in case either of the battle plans are to be put into action. A military setup works on the basis of accomplishing mission objectives, built around an unbending command and control structure. Once a plan is drawn, there is no room for debate, no need for argument or negotiation. The plan has to be followed precisely, period. This is an undeniable fact. In Jack Nicholson’s words as Col. Jessop in A few Good Men: “We follow orders, son. We follow orders or people die. It’s that simple.” It becomes a matter of life and death on the battlefield and orders are to be followed precisely.
A military hierarchy accustomed to such a structure – its personnel nurtured over a period of years and decades – results in two outcomes. The institution exists within its own ecosystem and becomes detached from the intricacies of a civilian setup. This is natural, considering the amount of focus required to breed and live the culture. Secondly, the military manpower’s capacity is only suited to govern and manage its own structure and systems. It might be good at a few things, common to civilian systems (engineering, logistics, etc), but nowhere enough to run the diverse institutions of an entire country, its economy, diplomatic and bureaucratic arrangements. The problem arises when the military setup considers itself an authority not just over these arrangements, but also what is good for the country and its people. This may be well intentioned, but deficient in terms of the will of the people. Failing to appreciate this, the military does what it does best; exploit the fear of the gun. It goes on a rampage, pillaging and plundering, resulting in absolute corruption. Hence the analogy of Maslow’s law of instrument: “If the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail.”
There is no sustainability and longevity derived from a military setup. The advent of the nation state has ensured that the time of conquests has ended. Couple this now with a highly interconnected and politically aware populace, it is virtually impossible to exert undue pressure on the resolve of the people. It is the people who are in charge, and will remain to be as such. No matter how much force is exercised, there will always be so many bullets in a gun.
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